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1. Introduction
Robert Ennis does a service by reminding us of the importance of definitions and, specifically,
the importance of defining ‘critical thinking.’ But in the process, he seems to lose sight of the
fundamental kind of definition, viz., what Copi (1998) calls “theoretical definitions,” and of a
criterion for a good definition. Ennis’s discussion seems to meander a bit because of this. Let me
first review some of the kinds of definition in light of this and make my critical comments about
Ennis’s discussion in light of that.
2. Definitions
I take it that the primary function of language is to represent and communicate. So the primary
function of definitions is to do likewise, in the form of theoretical definitions, in which the
definiens takes the form of an answer to a “What is…?” question, as when Socrates asked, in the
Theaetetus, “What is knowledge?”. The definiens constitutes the essential properties of the
definiendum—its nature—its necessary and sufficient conditions—what makes it what it is. The
definiens is the core recipe for the definiendum. One need not be a Platonist about all this,
however. For example, homo sapiens have certain characteristics, as detailed by Linnaean
Taxonomy, but that is not to say that that set of characteristics was waiting in the heavens for us
to instantiate.
Sometimes theoretical definitions are the result of conceptual analysis, done from the
armchair, and sometimes one must get up out of the armchair and do some lab work—expertise
is required. It is by virtue of people’s differing degrees of expertise that we often get a difference
between a theoretical definition and a reportive definition, the latter being merely a description
of what laypeople commonly mean by the definiendum, which is often recorded in a dictionary
of common usage (albeit, there is often some lag time between these two, hence those who also
distinguish lexical definitions, as a separate kind).
While the goal of a theoretical definition is to detail the nature or necessary and sufficient
conditions of the definiendum, often this is an ideal that is in principle impossible to achieve.
This was Wittgenstein’s point in the Investigations (1953, §§66-7)—very few concepts lend
themselves to an analysis consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions. Most concepts, and
the terms representing them, are vague, e.g., “bald” and “game.” For baldness, there is no magic
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number one hair less than which makes one bald; likewise for “heap,” there is no magic grain of
sand the addition of which makes a heap. And for games, there are only family resemblances
among them—groupings or “clusters” of features that are shared by some but not all—features
that, if shared by all, no longer do any real work in distinguishing games from other kinds of
activities. This is simply what it is to be vague, which, ironically, implies that ‘vague’ is one of
the few non-vague terms, since the necessary and sufficient condition for vagueness is the lack
of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Just because a concept or term is vague, however, does not entail that it is subjective and
up for grabs as to how it is to be used—just the contrary. Clear-cut cases of vague concepts are
just that—clear cut. Michael Jordon is clearly bald, the crew from ZZ Top is clearly not, and I
am a fuzzy case—in principle indeterminate—at least for a while yet.
But upon learning that most of our concepts and corresponding definitions are vague, too
many people have misunderstood this to mean that those concepts and definitions are subjective,
thereby adopting the Humpty-Dumpty view that words mean whatever users intend them to
mean (Carroll, 1871). This gives rise to the abuse of stipulative definitions. Instances of this that
are of special interest to us are the arbitrary ways ‘critical thinking’ has been defined, e.g., so
absurdly broadly that any thought or any thought about a thought (i.e., metacognition) constitutes
CT. With this view comes the complete lack of recognition of expertise in CT, since, as with all
subjective matters, all opinions are equal—e.g., there is no expert on whether or not strawberries
taste good. This explains why the director of my university’s general-education program said to
me, “Who died and made you king of critical thinking?” as I proposed criteria for courses offered
in the program’s CT category. My university, then, naturally went on to maintain that all its
courses are CT courses “by definition.”
In a sense, every term introduced into the language is given an initial stipulative
definition. That’s fine. But once a term takes on a shared use, redefining it so as to stipulate a
different meaning is highly suspicious, unless one provides ample reason for the redefinition and
informs fellow language users of the change—for example, when a specific dollar amount
(within the fuzzy area) is stipulated as the “poverty line,” so as to be able to implement a social
welfare policy (what some would call giving a “precising” definition or an “operational”
definition of ‘poverty’).
A special case of the abuse of stipulative definitions is when people use persuasive
definitions to support their conclusions. Persuasive definitions are produced by adding values to
the definiens that are not necessary conditions or omitting values that are necessary conditions,
thus enabling one to derive one’s normative conclusion “by definition.” For example, it’s easy to
conclude that abortion is unethical if you define it as the murder of an innocent unborn person.
A good definition, besides doing its best to be neither too broad nor too narrow, should
facilitate one’s understanding of the definiendum. This educational criterion prohibits the likes
of circular definitions, e.g., defining ‘bachelor’ as one who instantiates bachelorhood. It also
requires that one use more elementary concepts in the definiens than in the definiendum, thus
obliging us to tailor definitions as best we can to the background knowledge of our audience—to
put things into “small words.” For example, Ennis’s definition of ‘argument,’ as “an attempt to
justify a position,” might fail in this regard: People probably have a better initial understanding
of what an argument is than what it is to “justify” a position.
And with that, I guess I have finished my preparatory remarks on definitions and have
begun my critique of Ennis’s discussion.
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3. Critique re. definitions
Regarding his various “forms” of definitions, I really don’t see much need for most of them:
Off hand, I can’t think of a single theoretical definition that’s not “classificational.” And
they don’t seem to be restricted to nouns, e.g., to argue is to offer reasons to believe that a
statement is true.
“Equivalent-expression” definitions often fail the educational criterion, as with Ennis’s
example of defining “bias” in terms of “prejudice.” They also permit mere co-extension to pass
for definition, as with defining homo sapien as the only mammal with a normal body
temperature of 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit—even though the latter is a reliable indicator of the
former (assuming that it’s true, and I think it is), it is a deplorable definition.
“Range” definitions just acknowledge those many times when theoretical definitions
cannot in principle achieve their ideal of providing necessary and sufficient conditions. This is
more the rule than the exception: e.g., even with bachelor, defined as an adult unmarried male—
the vagueness of adulthood makes the definiens vague.
The nature of a “positional” definition is unclear to me: At times, it appears no different
from a theoretical definition that one uses to simply draw a conclusion, as with Ennis’s example
of inferring that Pluto is not a planet, in light of the International Astronomical Union’s 2006
definition. Ennis’s other example, of defining marriage as between a man and a woman, is
accounted for as a stipulative definition, without the need for positing another kind of definition.
“Operational” definitions seem to be a distinct kind; however, Ennis seems to equivocate
in his analysis of them: between 1) their originally proposed function of reducing a theoretical
object, event, or state of affairs to a set of measureable inputs and outputs and 2) a criterial (nondefinitional) function of using that set of measureable inputs and outputs as merely indicating a
theoretical object, event, or state of affairs.
4. Critique re. definitions of CT
I think I’m in general agreement with Ennis’s notion of CT, which he calls “mainstream” and
which he claims is described in various ways by his 14 examples of definitions of CT. I am
uncertain, however, whether it is so mainstream now or whether it has been relegated to the
backwaters. There are so many advocates of the minimalist subjectivist view of CT and the
rhetorical view of CT that we might well be in the minority.
That is why it is so important to make one of the necessary conditions of CT quite
explicit in one’s definition, viz., the use of reasons as evidence to support one’s beliefs, values,
and actions. It is this that distinguishes CT from mere metacognition, which is mere valueclarification and mere self-reflection on one’s beliefs and intentions. And that is why it is also so
important to make another necessary condition of CT quite explicit in one’s definition, viz., the
goal of truth and avoidance of error in the formation of arguments, beliefs, values, and action
plans based on one’s reasons. It is this goal that keeps CT distinct from rhetoric, which has the
goal of merely persuading others into accepting conclusions and adopting beliefs, values, or
actions plans for whatever reasons. [Note that most of the exemplary definitions Ennis quotes are
somewhat ambiguous in this latter respect.]
By the way: Those advocating the minimalist subjectivist view of CT are often quick to
counter that they are fine with CT’s truth-conducive goal, because what, after all, is truth other
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than mere opinion? It’s all a matter of taste, individual or collective! When shown how selfcontradictory that position is, they proudly quote Whitman (1855/2009): “Do I contradict
myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.).” To avoid getting
sucked into their infinite loop of ignorance at this point, it’s best to just walk away instead of
explaining how this too is self-refuting.
Primarily though, I have some qualms about the concept-conception distinction that
Ennis thinks is so helpful in understanding definitions.
Concepts, as mental representations, can be quite coarse-grained, as with a small child’s
ability to identify the shape △ (which we call ‘triangle’) and distinguish it from other shapes.
But concepts can be very fine-grained—as fine-grained as the propositional attitudes in which
they serve as representational content. For example, one can believe that △ is a trilateral closed
figure without being able to believe that △ is a triangular closed figure, for lack of the
component concept “angle.” The intensionality of propositional attitudes surpasses not only coextension but also logical equivalence. One option might be to say that these are different
“conceptions” of the single concept we call ‘triangle.’ I will argue that this is not a viable option
with the concept of CT, however.
Differences in concepts of CT can be quite embedded and hidden from view in one’s
definition. Take for example my definition, which Ennis has mentioned: “The practice of
identifying, having, and giving good reasons for one’s beliefs, values, and actions, given one’s
goals of truth and avoidance of error.” Because this definition is only a one-liner, it naturally
violates the educational criterion of a good definition until I explain what constitutes “good”
reasons: Good reasons are analyzed in terms of cogency, which is analyzed by means of three
conditions—the acceptability of premises, their relevance in their support of the conclusion, and
their sufficient support so as to make their conclusion at least probably true. And these conditions
are analyzed even further to better guarantee that they are understandable to the audience. For
example, the acceptability condition requires that one have more reason to believe the premises
are true than not to believe them. Now, what about the person who thinks that the only way to
meet the sufficiency condition is by means of deductive entailment? Do they have a different
concept of cogency and, in turn, of CT than I do? I’m inclined to say, yes; and I think Ennis
would agree. What about the person who thinks that the only way of achieving acceptable
premises is by means of the foundationalist theory of justification, while I advocate more of a
coherentist view? Do we have different concepts of cogency and, in turn, CT? I’m still inclined
to say, yes; but I think Ennis would say that this is a mere difference in conceptions. Differences
in the constituents of cogency make for different concepts. Note, however, that those differences
need not make a difference in our acquisition and exercise of CT skills in most situations (for
example, when we still agree that cogent arguments must have acceptable premises).
Differences certainly would make a difference, however, in the case of someone who thinks that
only deductive arguments are cogent—for them, there would be no cogent scientific reasoning,
which is contrary to the goal of CT, since so many of our beliefs, values, and actions are based
on scientific reasoning.
I question the usefulness of Rawl’s distinction between the concept of justice and its
various conceptions. What he seems to call the concept of justice, as “the ethical distribution of
burdens and benefits” or “treating cases that are alike in all relevant respects alike and treating
cases that differ in relevant respects differently,” is empty until one specifies what ethical is and
what the relevant respects are. The theories of justice created by making those specifications are
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not just “conceptions,” they are different concepts proposed as attempts to capture the nature of
justice.
This saves us from questions about when a difference in definitions is enough to qualify
as a difference in concepts as opposed to a mere difference in conceptions. Is the minimalist
subjectivist (espousing the metacognition account of CT as mere thinking about one’s thinking)
offering a different conception or have they crossed some penumbra to offer instead a different
concept? By offering a procedural theory of justice, instead of an end-state theory, has Rawls
offered a different concept of justice instead of a different conception? By offering procedural
and consensus views of objectivity and truth, instead of views with realist commitments, have
the pragmatist and the relativist, respectively, offered different concepts or merely different
conceptions? I can’t see any non-arbitrary way of deciding. Luckily, I don’t have to, since
concepts and conceptions seem to be one and the same thing.
The concept-conception distinction is especially misleading in the case of defining CT.
This is because CT, just as “game,” is not a natural kind that stands still so as to lend itself to
analysis. As we analyze the nature of games, by looking and seeing, as Wittgenstein would say,
we find only multifarious features, coming and going, among what we deem to be games,
creating only family resemblances among them. This is because what it is to play a game is an
evolving construct, to which all of us are making installments and altering them as we go. This is
illustrated with the help of Bernard Suits’s (1967) gallant attempt to refute Wittgenstein by
defining playing a game as: “to engage in activity directed toward bringing about a specific state
of affairs, using only means permitted by specific rules, where the means permitted by the rules
are more limited in scope than they would be in the absence of the rules, and where the sole
reason for accepting such limitations is to make possible such activity.” Even this definition has
become too narrow, because it requires that playing a game is an activity, which would fail to
account for “staring someone down,” which is considered a game by many. A group of people
might also compete for who outlives the rest, under the rule that members can’t kill each other
off. This too is construable as a game—it has a “winning” end state—but outliving is not an
activity, it’s a process or state that one suffers.
This is why Ennis’s analogy to his house, of which there may be numerous more or less
accurate descriptions, is quite misleading. We each have our own house that we have constructed
to more or less fulfill our goals of providing shelter and privacy. If we have other goals, we
might well construct very different structures. This is what seems to explain our different
concepts (and corresponding definitions) of CT, and whether they are even concepts or
definitions of CT at all, which hinge on whether one’s goal is the truth-conducive formation of
beliefs, values, and action plans by means of reasons, as opposed to the goal of mere selfreflection with no normative assessment or the goal of the formation of beliefs, values, and
action plans in others, again, with no normative assessment. The minimalist subjectivist’s
concept, for example, as mere metacognition, is not even close to being CT. It is like a game
with no rules, and that’s no game at all.
To complicate things even more, Ennis seems to equivocate on the notion of “conception.”
For most of his discussion, the components of what he calls one’s conception of CT are
construed as essential components. But he also has another sense of conception, as “a proposed
plan for achieving the instantiation of the concept to at least some extent,” i.e., “specific things to
teach” for enhancing students’ CT skills. For example, understanding formal and informal
fallacies in natural language greatly facilitates—but they are not necessary conditions for—one’s
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ability to correctly assess the cogency of arguments. I’m fine with such curricular suggestions; I
would simply urge Ennis to find a different term than ‘conceptions’ of CT for them.
So concepts such as CT are quite fine-grained and individualistic, but that doesn’t make
them solipsistic: Think of two people each having their concept “game” consisting of the same
cluster of properties except that one requires that a game be an activity and the other does not.
They could very well spend decades agreeing on everything regarding games, until the case of
staring someone down crops up—“while it might be competitive, it’s not a game” says the one.
The difference finally made a difference, but hardly.
What matters for us is that our definitions (and concepts) of CT help direct the
enhancement of our cognitive skills and those of our students, so as to become more truthconducive in our judgments, decisions, and actions. Definitions of CT with no hope of doing this,
such as those focusing on mere metacognition or mere persuasion, are clearly outliers and do a
disservice to everyone.
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